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Abstract
Binary analysis is traditionally used in the realm of malware
detection. However, the same technique may be employed by
an attacker to analyze the original binaries in order to reverse
engineer them and extract exploitable weaknesses. When a bi-
nary is distributed to end users, it becomes a common remotely
exploitable attack point. Code obfuscation is used to hinder
reverse engineering of executable programs. In this paper, we
focus on securing binary distribution, where attackers gain ac-
cess to binaries distributed to end devices, in order to reverse
engineer them and find potential vulnerabilities. Attackers
do not however have means to monitor the execution of said
devices. In particular, we focus on the control flow obfusca-
tion — a technique that prevents an attacker from restoring the
correct reachability conditions for the basic blocks of a pro-
gram. By doing so, we thwart attackers in their effort to infer
the inputs that cause the program to enter a vulnerable state
(e.g., buffer overrun). We propose a compiler extension for
obfuscation and a minimal hardware modification for dynamic
deobfuscation that takes advantage of a secret key stored in
hardware. We evaluate our experiments on the LLVM compiler
toolchain and the BRISC-V open source processor. On PAR-
SEC benchmarks, our deobfuscation technique incurs only a
5% runtime overhead. We evaluate the security of Drndalo by
training classifiers on pairs of obfuscated and unobfuscated
binaries. Our results shine light on the difficulty of producing
obfuscated binaries of arbitrary programs in such a way that
they are statistically indistinguishable from plain binaries.
1. Introduction
There is a multitude of software vulnerabilities that allow an
attacker to gain unauthorized access to the critical parts of a
multi-user system. For example, in modern server environ-
ments, an attacker logged in as a regular user is interested in
running a malicious program as the privileged user. One of the
techniques to achieve their goal is privilege escalation through
exploiting buffer overflows. To mount a buffer overflow, the
attacker looks for an appropriate location in the targeted bi-
nary. If the plain version of the binary that runs in privileged
mode is available to the attacker, the job of hunting for the
mount points becomes easier. For example, the attacker may
undertake the reverse engineering of the original software or
can only explore the input space to find the malicious inputs.
To prevent reverse engineering, software vendors resort to
software obfuscation — a technique generally applicable to a
wide range of problems as we discuss in Section 8.
One of the most effective obfuscation targets is the pro-
gram’s control flow (CF). CF obfuscation is a technique in
which a dedicated program called the obfuscator performs
semantic-preserving transformations on the original program
in order to hide the original CF. This kind of obfuscation tra-
ditionally heavily relies on opaque predicates. A predicate is
opaque if its resolution is hard or ambiguous for the attacker.
The technique of opaque predicates is used in obfuscation
tools such as Obfuscator-LLVM [10]. The construction of an
opaque predicate is done by tailoring a computationally inten-
sive challenge for the underlying concolic execution engine
such as present in Mayhem [6], Angr [24] or Triton [19]. Some
of the challenges proposed by Xu et. al. [31] are: symbolic
memory, floating-point algebra, covert symbolic propagation
and parallel programming. This approach provides the mecha-
nism for constructing multiple different concrete challenges
from the same basic templates. Despite a certain amount of
generality, an attacker can expose the constructed challenges
by observing similar patterns in the critical sections of the
binary. Upon successful detection of such patterns, an attacker
can unfold them to restore the original semantics. This is possi-
ble because the majority of the challenges that are constructed
for this purpose have completely deterministic behavior. That
is, for the particular input they always produce the same out-
put. But the power of a versatile attacker goes far beyond
that. New advances in concolic execution engines allow them
to solve more of computationally intensive tasks generated
by opaque predicates. The state-of-the-art techniques for bi-
nary analysis of real world software are becoming practical
and mature [1, 24, 6, 22, 9, 15, 27, 25, 19]. For example,
Angr [24] is powerful enough to automatically translate low
level disassembler information to an abstract level in which it
can do unified analysis for a variety of different platforms. It
can also perform symbolic analysis of the program’s control
flow to infer reachability conditions for the basic blocks of
interest. Furthermore, it can simulate the processor execution
and even the interaction with the operating system. When
symbolic analysis falls short, Angr supports different fuzzing
techniques [25] to help symbolic analysis. We discuss the
function of Angr in more details in Section 5.
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The advances in flexibility of hardware design promoted
by the initiatives such as RISC-V and OpenRISC create fer-
tile soil for hardware-software co-designs. However, RISC-
V binaries pose easier targets for reverse engineering than,
e.g., x86 binaries. As opposed to x86 binaries, RISC-V bi-
naries have fixed-size instruction lengths and clearly separate
code from data, which is one of the challenges for reverse
engineering of x86 binaries. Thus, we rethink the CF ob-
fuscation in the context of hardware-software co-design and
propose Drndalo — a lightweight hardware-assisted control
flow obfuscation technique. Our approach does not rely on
the lack of obfuscation-specific features of the binary analysis
frameworks nor their theoretical limitations, but on a safely
distributed hardware-software shared secret.
Whole-executable encryption may pose a plausible alterna-
tive to CF obfuscation. The device running the encrypted code
can either decrypt the executable in bulk, or just-in-time [5].
While this secures the binary against distribution-time attacks,
in order to maintain similar performance compared to a de-
vice running unencrypted code, the device may need to have
hardware decryption modules and enough memory to store
the decrypted code. For small embedded devices, this may
be prohibitive due to hardware area (potentially increasing
the device cost), and power (both from the cryptographic ac-
celerator and additional memory). We therefore propose a
lightweight alternative to binary encryption, both in terms of
area and power.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We introduce a new hardware-assisted CF obfuscation tech-
nique utilizing a minimal extension to BRISC-V processor
core, LLVM compiler and a secret key stored in hardware,
• We evaluate the security of our method against automated at-
tacks based on different classifiers and analyze their success
rates,
• We highlight and discuss the family of scenarios in which
our obfuscation technique exhibits imperfections and pro-
pose possible enhancements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we model our attack scenario and explain the means that an
attacker has at its disposal. In Section 3 we describe the details
of the obfuscation process that happens in the compiler. In
Section 4 we explain the deobfuscation phase that takes place
in hardware and describe the needed extensions to underlying
processor core. In Section 5 we describe the internals of
Angr [24] that empower the attacker from our attack model.
In Section 6 we evaluate the overhead of our Drndalo method
through a comparison of different deobfuscation phase designs.
In Section 7 we evaluate the security of our method against the
classifiers that have access to obfuscated and plain binaries.
In Section 8 we give an overview of the literature that tackles
the problem of program obfuscation. Finally, in Section 9 we
discuss the possible extensions of our work to maximize its
security against the classification based attacks and conclude
our paper in Section 10.
2. Attack Model
In our scenario, an organization developing software needs to
deploy the software to client machines, but wants to prevent
attackers from gaining access to the program’s original behav-
ior. The organization does that by obfuscating reachability
conditions for the basic blocks in the compiled binaries. The
organization performs the obfuscation and sends the obfus-
cated version of the binary to clients. The organization can
(1) obfuscate binaries in a client-agnostic fashion, or (2) can
separately obfuscate the binaries for each individual client.
In either case, the binary is deobfuscated using some secret
value, e.g., a key or a physical unclonable function (PUF) [26]
challenge-response pair. Both obfuscation and deobfuscation
procedures are public and described in Section 3 and Section 4,
respectively. The obfuscation hinges on the security of the
secret value.
The attackers are able to steal any number of (possibly
differently) obfuscated binaries once they have left the organi-
zation, but are unable to steal the deobfuscation keys. If the
deobfuscation hinges on a specific piece of hardware (as in the
case of PUFs), the attackers do not have access to the actual
chip that can deobfuscate the code. The attackers steal the
obfuscated binaries by either intercepting network traffic to
the client or by stealing the binaries from the drives of infected
clients. The attackers can also perform obfuscation of their
own programs with their own keys arbitrarily many times. In
our scenario, the attackers cannot however monitor the exe-
cution of the original binary on the target machines, i.e., the
binary theft and the binary execution occur at different times.
In our obfuscation and deobfuscation procedures that we
discus in Sections 3 and 4 we use a cryptographic hash func-
tion. In fact, the security of the hash function is orthogonal
to the Drndalo technique that we propose. In our experimen-
tal settings we use a parametrizable Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR) due to its minimal hardware cost. However,
a defender with higher security requirements may want to
use a cryptographically secure hash function (e.g., SHA) with
higher hardware and performance costs.
3. Obfuscation Procedure
The essence of our approach relies on potentially inverting all
the conditional branches in the original program. For each
branch, the obfuscator decides whether to invert that branch by
evaluating a function that takes two inputs: (1) a unique iden-
tifier of the branch (e.g., the address of the instruction), and
(2) a program key, and produces a 1-bit output. If the function
returns a 1, the branch condition is inverted, otherwise it is not.
In our implementation, we use a cryptographic hash function
with a binary output. Hence, the only secret information is the
deobfuscation key.
Table 1 summarizes the translations that are used for obfus-
cation and deobfuscation if the hash function answers with the
value 1 for the conditional branch under consideration.
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Figure 1 shows a segment of the original code of an example
C program while Figure 2 shows its assembly. Assuming that
the hash function returns the value 1 for both conditional
branches marked in gray, the obfuscated RISC-V assembly is
shown in Figure 3.
Table 1: Basic table of translations used if the hash function
returns a 1. IF_END labels the basic block that is not executed
when the branch with the condition from the first column is
taken. IF_THEN labels the basic block that is executed if the
branch is taken.
Condition Original branch Obfuscated branch
x1 == x2 bne x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
beq x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 != x2 beq x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
bne x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 < x2 bge x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
blt x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 > x2 bge x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
blt x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 <= x2 blt x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
bge x2, x1 .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 >= x2 blt x1, x2 , .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
bge x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
ure 1 shows a segment of the original code of an example C
program while Figure 2 shows its assembly. Assuming that the
as function returns the value 1 for both c nditional branches
marked in gray, the obfuscated RISC-V assembly is shown in
Figure 3.
Table 1: Basi t l l ti s used if the hash function
returns a 1. l l t sic block that is not executed
when the branch ith the condition from the first column is
taken. IF_THEN labels the basic block that is executed if the
branch is taken.
Condition Original branch Obfuscated branch
x1 == x2 bne x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
beq x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 != x2 beq x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
bne x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 < x2 bge x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
blt x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 > x2 bge x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
blt x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 <= x2 blt x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
bge x2, x1 .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 >= x2 blt x1, x2 , .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
bge x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
1 if (atoi(args[1]) > atoi(args[2]))
2 printf("Basic Block A");
3 if (atoi(args[2]) < atoi(args[3]))
4 printf("Basic Block B");
Figure 1: Segment of the example C program before obfusca-
tion.
1 main:
2 ...
3 call atoi
4 bge a0, a1, .LBB0_2
5 j .LBB0_1
6 .LBB0_1:
7 lui a0, %hi(.L.str)
8 addi a0, a0, %lo(.L.str)
9 call printf
10 j .LBB0_2
11 .LBB0_2:
12 call atoi
13 bge a1, a0, .LBB0_4
14 j .LBB0_3
15 ...
Figure 2: Plain code
1 main:
2 ...
3 call atoi
4 blt a0, a1, .LBB0_2
5 j .LBB0_1
6 .LBB0_1:
7 lui a0, %hi(.L.str)
8 addi a0, a0, %lo(.L.str)
9 call printf
10 j .LBB0_2
11 .LBB0_2:
12 call atoi
13 blt a1, a0, .LBB0_4
14 j .LBB0_3
15 ...
Figure 3: Obfuscated code
Figure 4: Example program assembly code before and after
obfuscation.
The obfuscated code from Figure 3, observed in isolation,
does not reveal that it is obfuscated even if our method is
known to the attacker. It represents a valid program in its own
right and it also does not contain obvious traces of obfuscation.
That is, the obfuscation is stealthy. In Section 7 we use a
classifier to quantitatively evaluate the stealth of our Drndalo
obfuscation.
In contrast to our Drndalo method, some of the existing
methods for control flow obfuscation [31] rely on the code
snippets that increase computational complexity of the original
program. However, those snippets, if known to the attacker,
can be spotted in the obfuscated program.
The main property that differentiates obfuscated program
from the plain program is the set of reachability conditions for
the basic blocks behind conditional branches. The topology of
the obfuscated CF graph and its original in the plain program
are identical. When an attacker executes the obfuscated pro-
gram by providing it with the inputs, the obfuscated program
has significantly different behavior from its original. That is,
the traces of execution affected by the reverted branches in
the obfuscated program are different from the traces in the
plain program. The mutated runtime behavior will give the
attacker a wrong set of crashing inputs (see Section 5). Each
conditional branch is either inverted or not with the same prob-
ability (provided that the hash function is secure). Given that
the attacker does not apply semantic and symbolic analysis,
the action of restoring the original program from the obfus-
cated program comes down to guessing the original branches
from the obfuscated branches. If the attacker applies brute
force only, its probability of success in restoring the original
program from the obfuscated program is P = 0.5n, where n is
the number of conditional branches.
The obfuscator itself is implemented as an LLVM Pass —
the same technique that LLVM compiler infrastructure uses
internally for its optimizations. The place of the obfuscator
in the LLVM compilation chain is given in Figure 5. At the
beginning, a high-level programming language is translated
to LLVM intermediate representation (IR) using the corre-
sponding compiler frontend. After the IR is obtained, LLVM’s
optimizer performs the optimizations in the specified order.
The obfuscator takes control over the process as the very last
optimization and performs the obfuscation immediately be-
fore the RISC-V backend. Since the branch obfuscation is
done at the level of LLVM IR, our technique supports all the
programming languages with compilers that target LLVM IR.
This group of programming languages includes C, C++, Rust,
Apple Swift and others.
Another reason to build our obfuscation as an optimization
on LLVM IR is our need to have a stealthy obfuscation. In
other words, we are minimizing the number of properties that
all obfuscated programs have in common even before consid-
ering conditional branches. By doing so, we aim at hindering
adversarial queries of the form “is this binary even obfuscated
or not”. A hypothetical obfuscation that would perform on
the resulting platform-specific assembly code would risk to
make the transformations that naturally cannot come from the
3
Figure 1: Segment of the example C program before obfusca-
tion.
ure 1 shows a segment of the original code of an example C
program while Figure 2 shows its assembly. Assuming that the
hash f nction returns the value 1 for both conditi nal branches
marked in gray, the obfuscated RISC-V assembly is shown in
Figure 3.
Table 1: Basic table of translations used if the hash function
returns a 1. IF_END labels the basic block that is not executed
when the branch with the condition from t first column is
taken. IF_THEN labels the basic block that is executed if the
branch is take .
Condition Original branch Obfuscated branch
x1 == x2 bne x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
beq x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 != x2 beq x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
bne x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 < x2 bge x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
blt x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 > x2 bge x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
blt x2, x1, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 <= x2 blt x2, x1, .IF_EN
j .I _
bge x2, x1 .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
x1 >= x2 lt 1, 2 , .IF_END
j .
bge x1, x2, .IF_END
j .IF_THEN
1 if (atoi(args[1]) > atoi(args[2]))
2 printf("Basic Block A");
3 if (atoi(args[2]) < atoi(args[3]))
4 printf("Basic Block B");
Figure 1: Segment of the example C program before obfusca-
tion.
1 main:
2 ...
3 call atoi
4 bge a0, a1, .LBB0_2
5 j .LBB0_1
6 .LBB0_1:
7 lui a0, %hi(.L.str)
8 addi a0, a0, %lo(.L.str)
9 call printf
10 j .LBB0_2
11 .LBB0_2:
12 call atoi
13 bge a1, a0, .LBB0_4
14 j .LBB0_3
15 ...
Figure 2: Plain code
1 main:
2 ...
3 call atoi
4 blt a0, a1, .LBB0_2
5 j .LBB0_1
6 .LBB0_1:
7 lui a0, %hi(.L.str)
8 addi a0, a0, %lo(.L.str)
9 call printf
10 j .LBB0_2
11 .LBB0_2:
12 call atoi
13 blt a1, a0, .LBB0_4
14 j .LBB0_3
15 ...
Figure 3: Obfuscated code
Figure 4: Example program assembly code before and after
obfuscation.
The obfuscated code from Figure 3, observed in isolation,
does not reveal that it is obfuscated even if our method is
known to the attacker. It represents a valid program in its own
right and it also does not contain obvious traces of obfuscation.
That is, the obfuscation is stealthy. In Section 7 we use a
classifier to quantitatively evaluate the stealth of our Drndalo
obfuscation.
In contrast to our Drnd lo method, some f the existing
methods for control flow obfuscation [31] rely on the code
snippets that increase computational complexity of the original
program. However, those snippets, if known to t attacker,
can be spotted in the obf scated pr gram.
The main property that diff rentiates obfuscated program
from the plain program is th set f reachability conditions for
the basic blocks behind conditional branche . The topology of
the obfuscated CF graph and its origin l in the plain prog am
are identical. W e an attacker execut the obfuscated pro-
gram by providing it with the inputs, the obfuscated program
has significantly different behavior from its original. That is,
the traces of execution affected by the reverted branches in
the obfuscated program are different from the traces in the
plain program. The mutated runtime behavior will give the
attacker a wrong set of crashing inputs (see Section 5). Each
conditional branch is either inverted or not with the same prob-
ability (provided that the hash function is secure). Given that
the attacker does not apply semantic and symbolic analysis,
the action of restoring the original program from the obfus-
cated program comes down to guessing the original branches
from the obfuscated branches. If the attacker applies brute
force only, its probability of success in restoring the original
program from the obfuscated program is P = 0.5n, where n is
the number of conditional branches.
The obfuscator itself is implemented as an LLVM Pass —
the same technique that LLVM compiler infrastructure uses
internally for its optimizations. The place of the obfuscator
in the LLVM compilation chain is given in Figure 5. At the
beginning, a high-level programming language is translated
to LLVM intermediate representation (IR) using the corre-
sponding compiler frontend. After the IR is obtained, LLVM’s
optimizer performs the optimizations in the specified order.
The obfuscat r takes c ntrol over the process as the very last
optimization and performs the obfuscation immediately be-
fore the RISC-V backend. Since the branch obfuscation is
done at the level of LLVM IR, our tech ique supports all the
programming anguages with compilers that targe LLVM IR.
This group of programm ng languages includes C, C++, ust,
Apple Swift and others.
Another reason to build our obfuscation as an optimization
on LLVM IR is ur need to have stealthy bfuscation. In
other words, we are minimizing the number of properties that
all obfuscated programs have in common even before consid-
ering conditional branches. By doing so, we aim at hindering
adversarial queries of the form “is this binary even obfuscated
or not”. A hypothetical obfuscation that would perform on
the resulting platform-specific assembly code would risk to
make the transformations that naturally cannot come from the
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Figure 2: Plain code
re s s a se e t f t e ri i al c e f a e a le
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Figure 3: Obfuscated code
Figure 4: Example pr gram assembly code befor and after
obfuscation.
The obfuscated code from Figure 3, observed in isolation,
does not reveal that it is obfuscated even if our method is
known to the attacker. It represents a valid program in its own
right and it also does not contain obvious traces of obfuscation.
That is, the obfuscation is stealthy. In Section 7 we use a
classifier to quantit tively evaluate the stealth of our Drndalo
obfuscation.
In contrast to our Drndalo method, some of the existing
methods for c ntrol flow obfuscation [31] rely on the code
snippets that increase computational complexity of the original
program. However, those snippets if known to the attacker,
can be spotted in the obfuscated program.
The main property that differentiates obfuscated program
from the plain program is the set of reachability conditions for
the basic blocks behind conditional branches. The topology of
the obfuscated CF graph and its original in the plain program
are identical. When an attacker executes the obfuscated pro-
gram by providing it with the inputs, the obfuscated program
has significantly different behavior from its original. That is,
the traces of execution affected by the reverted branches in
the obfuscated program are different from the traces in the
plain program. The mutated runtime behavior will give the
attacker a wrong set of crashing inputs (see Section 5). Each
conditional branch is either inverted or not with the same prob-
ability (provided that the hash function is secure). Given that
the attacker does not apply semantic and symbolic analysis,
the action of restoring the original program from the obfus-
cated program comes down to guessing the original branches
from the obfuscated branches. If the attacker applies brute
force only, its probability of success in restoring the original
program from the obfuscated program is P = 0.5n, where n is
the number of conditional branches.
The obfuscat r it elf is imple ented as an LLVM Pa s —
the same technique that LLVM compiler infrastructure uses
internally for its optimizations. The place of the obfuscator
in the LLVM compilation chain is give in Figure 5. At the
b ginning, a high-level programming language is translated
to L VM intermediate representation (IR) sing the corre-
spo ding compiler frontend. After the IR is obtained, LLVM’s
optimizer performs the optimizations in the specified order.
The obfuscator takes control over the process as the very last
optimization and performs the obfuscation immediately be-
fore the RISC-V backend. Since the branch obfuscation is
done at the level of LLVM IR, our technique supports all the
programming languages with compilers that target LLVM IR.
This group of programming languages includes C, C++, Rust,
Apple Swift and others.
Another reason to build our obfuscation as an optimization
on LLVM IR is our need to have a stealthy obfuscation. In
other words, we are minimizing the number of properties that
all obfuscated programs have in common even before consid-
ering conditional branches. By doing so, we aim at hindering
adversarial queries of the form “is this binary even obfuscated
or not”. A hypothetical obfuscation that would perform on
the resulting platform-specific assembly code would risk to
make the transformations that naturally cannot come from the
given compiler. In a realistic scenario, an attacker could know
the compiler that the victim software owner uses. From that
information an attacker could infer that the given binary can-
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CORE
define dso_local i32 @main() #0
{
 %1 = alloca i32, align 4
 store i32 0, i32* %1, align 4
 ret i32 513
}
RISC-V
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swiftc main.swift
clang main.c
clang++ main.cpp
rustc main.rs
main:
    addi sp, sp, -16
    sw ra, 12(sp)
    sw s0, 8(sp)
    addi s0, sp, 16
    sw zero, -12(s0)
    addi a0, zero, 513
    hw s0, 8(sp)
    hw ra, 12(sp)
    addi sp,sp, 16
    ret
LLVM
 BACKEND
Figure 5: Place of the obfuscator in the LLVM compilation process. The obfuscation is done as the very last optimization.
not come from the known compiler. For example, an attacker
might consider the registers utilization patterns in the obfus-
cated binary. The information on register utilization patterns
can be obtained using an advanced reverse engineering tool as
described in Section 5.
4. Deobfuscation Procedure
The obfuscated program correctly executes only on a trusted
RISC-V core designed to support deobfuscation and supplied
with the secret key. We outline four designs here: the baseline,
stalled-hash, cached-hash and the mask-based design.
Baseline design: the baseline design is a 7-stage RISC-V
CPU without any hardware modifications enabling obfusca-
tion [2]. The processor uses synchronous block RAM (BRAM)
for instruction and data memories, which requires 2 extra
stages over a typical 5-stage processor. A simplified processor
architecture is illustrated in Figure 6.
Stalled-hash design: here, the baseline CPU is equipped with
a hardware hash function. When a branch instruction is in the
decode stage, the hash function is fed with the branch instruc-
tion address and the program key. When the branch instruction
reaches the execute stage, all the stages up to and including
the execute stage are stalled until the hash function produces
an output. Once a (single bit) output is produced, that value is
XOR-ed with the branch signal. This way, branches that would
be taken may not be, and vice-versa. For the hash function, we
use a parametrizable Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
with n registers, and let the LFSR run for k,k > n cycles. A
cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator
may provide higher security at the cost of an increased latency,
causing the processor to stall more. As only a single hash
function is calculated at any given time, pipelining the hash
function brings no benefit. Additionally, since the output of the
hash is pseudo-random, a branch predictor may at best have
a 50% chance of guessing the branch result. The modified
architecture is illustrated in Figure 7.
Cached-hash design: since the hash function output is only
dependent on the address of each branch, the hash of a given
branch is constant. This allows us to cache the hashes of
previously evaluated branches. In this design, we add a cache
to the stalled-hash design. When a branch is in the decode
stage, the architecture starts calculating the hash function and
in parallel checks the cache for whether that branch’s hash
has previously been calculated. If not, when the hash function
finishes, it both feeds the value to the XOR gate, and saves
the result to the cache. If the value is found in the cache, it is
sent to the XOR, just in time as the branch enters the execute
stage, causing no stall. In our experiments we used a simple
256-line, one branch per line, direct-mapped cache.
Mask-based design: here, the baseline CPU is modified so
that the instruction memory is extended with a single ‘mask’
bit. The mask bit specifies whether a branch should be re-
versed or not. The mask bit follows the instruction through
the stages, and is consumed in the execute stage if the instruc-
tion is a branch. Having an independent mask bit per each
branch removes the possibility of an attacker predicting future
branches based on the existing ones. However, widening the
instruction word width complicates the design of L2 caches
and memory controllers. Furthermore, depending on the attack
model, the masks may need to be kept encrypted in memory
and decrypted on-the-fly.
5. Reverse Engineering of Obfuscated Code
Offensive binary analysis is a mixture of static and dynamic
techniques that discover crashing inputs. Besides the trivial
usage in compromising system’s availability, this family of
techniques can be used in attack surface exploration. Some of
the discovered crashes (overwritten function pointers, buffer
overflows, etc.) can be used by attackers to take control of a
program’s execution. One of the possible attacks applicable
to the results of offensive binary analysis is return-oriented
programming [18]. This particular technique draws much at-
tention because it does not require any code injection. Instead,
it constructs malicious actions from the instructions already
present in the address space of the executed program.
To show the behavior of the obfuscated binary under of-
fensive analysis we use Angr [24]. Its core binary analysis
features rely on concolic execution. This technique combines
symbolic and concrete execution to construct the inputs that
spot the vulnerabilities and eventually exploit them. Further,
we briefly discuss the structure and function of Angr without
claiming credit for its design or implementation.
Angr can analyze the binaries packed without the symbol
table and relocation information — stripped binaries. When
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Figure 8: The baseline and the stalled-hash processor diagrams.
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Figure 9: The structure of Angr.
the binary is given, the analysis process flows as shown in
Figure 9.
Binary loading. A universal loader creates an address space
in which it organizes all the needed binaries. The abstraction
of the address space is returned to the system. Besides ELF
binary format, Angr also supports others such as Microsoft
Windows PE. When the binary format is recognized, its header
is used to fetch the architecture information.
Lifting. Angr can analyze binaries targeting multiple architec-
tures. From the functional perspective, certain architectures
are similar to each other enough to be handled by a single
abstraction. General analysis algorithms are then applied to
the abstraction instead of each platform separately. For this
purpose, Angr reuses the Valgrind VEX [17] intermediate rep-
resentation. Roughly speaking, VEX abstraction consists of
1) establishing a unique register naming for all the platforms,
2) removing the differences in memory accesses and segmen-
tation, and 3) unfolding the instructions with side effects to
make them transparent.
Simulation. In accordance with architecture information, the
tool chooses the adequate simulation engine. Such an engine
uses basic blocks as the portions of program’s execution. It
further interprets the portions starting with an input state that
comprises of the register snapshot, memory etc. The results of
the simulation step are all the possible successor states. While
the simulation explores the branches, it collects the branch
conditions. Subsequently, each resulting successor state con-
tains its reachability condition. This is the prerequisite for the
cyber reasoning features in Angr. However, when the tool ex-
plores our obfuscated binary, it collects the branch conditions
whose correctness depends on whether obfuscator performed
the reversal or not. If the collected branch condition remained
intact during obfuscation, the simulation engine will discover
it correctly. Otherwise, if the simulation engine traverses at
least one reversed branch on its way to the successor state,
its reachability condition is rendered incorrect. Under the
premise of safe key distribution, by no means can the simula-
tion discover the correct branch conditions for all the branches
in a non-trivial program.
Constraint solving. All the simulation steps that the simulator
undertakes may be performed on concrete or symbolic values.
Symbolic values can be complex expressions and the oper-
ations on them result in the new symbolic expressions. For
example, if the value of the program counter depends on the
input of the program, all the transitions will be represented by
the symbolic expressions. The core of the constraint solver
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deployed in Angr leans on Satisfiability Modulo Theories [4]
carried by Microsoft’s Z3 solver [8]. This allows an attacker
to efficiently explore the inputs that lead to vulnerabilities.
However, our obfuscator eliminates the threat imposed thereof
since it makes the simulator construct the wrong constraints.
A quick and correct solution to the wrong constraints does not
equip the attacker with a functional vulnerability-discovering
input.
Operating system simulation. To simulate program’s interac-
tion with the operating system, Angr deploys the internal
implementation of system calls. It supports multiple operat-
ing system kernels including Linux. The simulated system
calls take effect on the simulated states that normally contain
symbolic values.
6. Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of Drndalo we set up a series of
experiments. The experiments are divided in two groups based
on the implementation of the deobfuscation phase. First, we
evaluate the performance and assess the security offered by
experimental in-software deobfuscation procedures. Second,
we measure the performance of various in-hardware deobfus-
cation implementations and discuss the security properties of
each.
6.1. In-software Deobfuscation
Due to our attack model, a deobfuscation procedure must be
capable of operating on the binary without debug symbols
or other additional information — stripped binaries. To pre-
cisely define the space of possible designs, we impose three
strict requirements to all in-software deobfuscation procedures:
1) knowing the correct key, a procedure must completely recre-
ate the original program semantics, 2) deobfuscation must
maximally avoid storing the plain version of the critical pro-
gram so as to minimize the attack surface, and 3) in doing so,
the procedure does not require any hardware modifications
and runs on commodity hardware.
According to the mechanics used for restoring the original
program from the obfuscated code and the secret key, we
outline two families of in-software deobfuscation procedures:
JIT-based deobfuscation. This approach is based on tradi-
tional just-in-time compilation techniques. The JIT compiler
implements the inverse transformation of the Table 1 and in-
curs no other transformation. For example, given the code
from the Figure 3, the compiler produces the code from the
Figure 2. The compiled instructions are stored and only need
to be deobfuscated once. Hence, the JIT penalty is propor-
tional to code size, and not the program runtime.
Our experimental in-software deobfuscation procedure is im-
plemented in Intel Pin dynamic binary instrumentation frame-
work [13]. This implementation of JIT compiler operates
on the basis of basic blocks and inspects all the conditional
branches. The basic steps of the JIT compiler are as fol-
lows: 1) load the secret key, 2) instrument all the conditional
CLE
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cisely define the space of possible designs, we impose three
strict requirements to all in-software deobfuscation procedures:
1) knowing the correct key, a procedure must completely recre-
ate the original program semantics, 2) deobfuscation must
maximally avoid storing the plain version of the critical pro-
gram so as to minimize the attack surface, and 3) in doing so,
the procedure does not require any hardware modifications
and runs on commodity hardware.
According to the mechanics used for restoring the original
program from the obfuscated code and the secret key, we
outline two families of in-software deobfuscation procedures:
JIT-based deobfuscation. This approach is based on tradi-
tional just-in-time compilation techniques. The JIT compiler
implements the inverse transformation of the Table 1 and in-
curs no other transformation. For example, given the code
from the Figure 3, the compiler produces the code from the
Figure 2. The compiled instructions are stored and only need
to be deobfuscated once. Hence, the JIT penalty is propor-
tional to code size, and not the program runtime.
Our experimental in-software deobfuscation procedure is im-
plemented in Intel Pin dynamic binary instrumentation frame-
work [13]. This implementation of JIT compiler operates
on the basis of basic blocks and inspects all the conditional
branches. The basic steps of the JIT compiler are as fol-
lows: 1) load the secret key, 2) instrument all the conditional
branches, 3) apply the hash function to the conditional branch
under consideration, 4) emit the branch instruction with the
appropriate reversed condition (Table 1 obfuscated branch to
original branch), 5) execute the next basic block. The simplest
possible construct that can serve a similar purpose as a hash
function is a bit mask of inversions generated by the obfus-
cator at compile time. In the absence of the key, we assume
that the bit mask is kept secret. Since each branch has the
same probability of being inverted, we assume that 50% of
the inversion bits are set. Our experimental deobfuscation
procedure caches the branches to assure that no branch inver-
sion is checked twice. Thus, our procedure needs to: 1) load
the corresponding inversion bit from the mask, 2) execute a
1 addi a1, zero, 4
2 blt a1, a0, .LBB0_2
Figure 10: Original assembly before runtime obfuscation.
compare instruction on the mask bit, and 3) execute the logic
of reverting, if needed. There are many different ways for
the JIT-compiler to perform the step 3 once it knows that it is
needed. However, we will make an optimistic assumption that
the logic of inversion will not take more than 10 instructions
per execution. The optimistic estimates for both cached and
non-cached JIT-compiler performance overheads are given in
Figure 11. The main difference between JIT with and without
caching is that when caching is disabled, the branch deobfus-
cation procedure is repeated for the repeating branches (e.g.,
branches in the loops). When caching is enabled, the result of
the deobfuscation procedure is reused.
Runtime deobfuscation. Another in-software deobfuscation
technique is to force the obfuscator to emit the code that
contains the branch calculation in runtime. Here the code
is obfuscated so as to load from the mask or calculate using
the hash function whether each branch should be reverted at
runtime. Given the original assembly in Figure 10, and opting
to use the bit mask in obfuscation, the obfuscator outputs
assembly as in Figure 12. When run, this code will find
the appropriate mask bit, calculate the branch condition, and
branch depending on the XOR-ed value of the two bits. Unlike
in the case of the JIT implementation, the runtime penalty
is proportional to the number of branches executed, and not
code size (as in the case of a JIT implementation). As shown
in Figure 12, runtime deobfuscation approach adds several
instructions per each branch, leading to significant code bloat
and a longer runtime. Figure 11 shows the overhead of the
runtime obfuscation being significantly higher than its JIT-
based counterpart. Hence, we opt for JIT-based deobfuscation
as a more efficient in-software solution.
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assembly as in Figure 12. When run, this code will find
the appropriate mask bit, calculate the branch condition, and
branch depending on the XOR-ed value of the two bits. Unlike
in the case of the JIT implementation, the runtime penalty
is proportional to the number of branches executed, and not
code size (as in the case of a JIT implementation). As shown
in Figure 12, runtime deobfuscation approach adds several
instructions per each branch, leading to significant code bloat
and a longer runtime. Figure 11 shows the overhead of the
runtime obfuscation being significantly higher than its JIT-
based counterpart. Hence, we opt for JIT-based deobfuscation
as a more efficient in-software solution.
6.2. In-hardware Deobfuscation
We simulate the four architectures listed in Section 4. The
baseline and the mask-based architectures have approximately
the same performance, so we omit the second one. Further,
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1 # S11 stores a pointer to the mask array
2 la s11, MASK
3 # get branch's mask bit address
4 auipc t1, 0 # get current IP
5 addi t1, t1, 12 # branch is 12 instructions down
6 srli t2, t1, 3 # get branch's byte offset in
mask↪→
7 add t2, t2, s11 # calc pointer to byte in mask
8 lb t2, 0(t2) # load mask byte containing
9 # branch IP mask bit
10 andi t3, t1, 7 # calc which bit has branch's
mask↪→
11 addi t4, zero, 1 # need a 1 for the shift
12 sll t4, t4, t3 # put a 1 at the t3 bit
13 and t2, t2, t4 # get specific branch mask bit
14 # if the mask bit stored in t2 was 0, the following
15 # instructions were outputted by the compiler
16 addi a1, zero, 4
17 slt t0, a1, a0 # calculate branch condition
18 # if the mask bit is 1, the following
19 # instructions were outputted by the compiler
20 addi a1, zero, 5
21 slt t0, a0, a1 # calc inverted branch condition
22 # finally, XOR the branch condition with the mask,
23 # undoing any possible branch inversion
24 xor t0, t0, t2 # potentially invert condition
25 bne t0, zero, .LBB0_2 # branch if XOR'd condition = 1
Figure 12: Assembly after runtime obfuscation.
6.2. In-hardware Deobfuscation
We simulate the four architectures listed in Section 4. The
baseline and the mask-based architectures have approximately
the same performance, so we omit the second one. Further,
we test two different hash-based architectures with an 8 and a
16-cycle hash function. In Figure 13, we see the performance
of different architectures on 6 different PARSEC tasks. Notice
that for the 16-cycle hash, the processor can slow down as
much as 60%. However, adding a (256-line, single branch
hash per line) direct-mapped cache removes the majority of
the performance overhead. As opposed to the in-software
implementations from Figure 11, the in-hardware techniques
achieve a negligible average runtime overhead of around 5%.
6.3. Hardware utilization
We implement the designs from Section 4 as modifications
to a baseline RISC-V CPU published in [2]. We synthesize 5
different designs using Altera Quartus:
Baseline: a baseline 7-stage in-order RISC-V CPU, with
BRAM-based instruction and data caches. The design is syn-
thesized with 16KB of instruction and data memory, hence the
BRAM utilization of the baseline design in Figure 14.
Stalled-hash: a modified design with a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR)-based hash function that stalls the design for
a parametrized number of cycles on every branch instruction.
We choose an LFSR over a more cryptographically secure
random number generator due to it’s small size and efficiency.
Cached-hash: an extended LFSR-based design with a cache
used for storing the LFSR outputs of previously seen branches.
Each cache stores a single bit hash value corresponding to an
instruction address. The cache is accessed in the decode stage,
and returns a match by the execute stage. If a match is found,
the design does not stall at all. We test two configurations:
a 256 and a 1024-line direct-mapped cache. In the current
implementation, the cache is synthesized using registers, but
can be stored in BRAM too.
Mask-based: a mask-based design, with an additional BRAM-
based cache storing one 1-bit hash value per each instruction.
This value is only used in branch instructions, and is otherwise
ignored.
The LUT, register, and block RAM counts of synthesized
designs are shown in Figure 14. Note that we have imple-
mented an separate hash cache from the instruction cache.
The majority of memory used for this cache is spent on tags,
not hash values. In future work we plan to explore an imple-
mentation that extends the L1 cache with the extra hash bit,
removing the need for storing the tags twice.
7. Security Evaluation
The security of our obufscation method relies on (1) the se-
curity of the hash function, and (2) the security of the branch
obfuscator module. Assuming that the hash function is crypto-
graphically safe, in this section we discuss the security of the
obfuscation method.
We empirically evaluate the security of our obufscation
method by attempting to deobfuscate binaries using a classifier
trained on both obfuscated and plain binaries from a dataset
of known programs. This type of attack is plausible since the
obfuscation method is published and the attacker can freely
create a dataset of plain and obfuscated binaries. Hence, an
attacker may be able to use an in-house trained classifier to
reconstruct an original control flow of an obfuscated binary
whose source they do not possess.
The classifier training pipeline is composed of:
1. Dataset collection: to create the dataset, we compile and
obfuscate 98 programs from the LLVM test suite single
source benchmarks 1.
2. Feature extraction: since the obfuscation is applied after
the compiler front-end, both the plain and the obfuscated
1github.com/llvm-mirror/test-suite/tree/master/SingleSource
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Figure 12: Assembly after runtime obfuscation.
we test two different hash-based architectures with an 8 and a
16-cycle hash function. In Figure 13, we see the performance
of different arc itect es on 6 different PARSEC tasks. Notice
that for the 16-cycle hash, the pro essor c n slow down as
much as 60%. However, adding a (256-line, single branch
hash per line) di c -mapped cache removes the m jority of
the performance overhead. As opposed to in-s ftware
implementations from Figure 11, the in-hardware techniques
achieve a negligible average runtime overhe d of around 5%.
6.3. Hardware utilization
We implement the designs from Section 4 as modifications
to a baseline RISC-V CPU published in [2]. We synthesize 5
different designs using Altera Quartus:
Baseline: a baseline 7-stage in-order RISC-V CPU, with
BRAM-based instruction and data caches. The design is syn-
thesized with 16KB of instruction and data memory, hence the
BRAM utilization of the baseline design in Figure 14.
Stalled-hash: a modified design with a linear feedback shift
register (LFSR)-based hash function that stalls the design for
a parametrized number of cycles on every branch instruction.
We choose an LFSR over a more cryptographically secure
random number generator due to it’s small size and efficiency.
Cached-hash: an extended LFSR-based design with a cache
used for storing the LFSR outputs of previously seen branches.
Each cache stores a single bit hash value corresponding to an
instruction address. The cache is accessed in the decode stage,
and returns a match by the execute stage. If a match is found,
the design does not stall at all. We test two configurations:
a 256 and a 1024-line direct-mapped cache. In the current
implementation, the cache is synthesized using registers, but
can be stored in BRAM too.
Mask-based: a mask-based design, with an additional BRAM-
based cache storing one 1-bit hash value per each instruction.
This value is only used in branch instructions, and is otherwise
ignored.
The LUT, register, and block RAM counts of synthesized
designs are shown in Figure 14. Note that we have imple-
mented an separate hash cache from the instruction cache.
The majority of memory used for this cache is spent on tags,
not hash values. In future work we plan to explore an imple-
mentation that extends the L1 cache with the extra hash bit,
removing the need for storing the tags twice.
7. Securit Evaluation
The security of our obufscation method relies on (1) the se-
curity of the hash function, and (2) the security of the branch
obfuscator module. Assuming that the hash function is crypto-
graphically safe, in this section we discuss the security of the
obfuscation method.
We empirically evaluate the security of our obufscation
method by attempting to deobfuscate binaries using a classifier
trained on both obfuscated and plain binaries from a dataset
of known programs. This type of attack is plausible since the
obfuscation method is published and the attacker can freely
create a dataset of plain and obfuscated binaries. Hence, an
attacker may be able to use an in-house trained classifier to
reconstruct an original control flow of an obfuscated binary
whose source they do not possess.
The classifier training pipeline is composed of:
1. Dataset collection: to create the dataset, we compile and
obfuscate 98 programs from the LLVM test suite single
source benchmarks 1.
2. Feature extraction: since the obfuscation is applied after
the compiler front-end, both the plain and the obfuscated
binaries will have the same topology, i.e., the control flow
graph of a binary before and after obfuscation remains the
same. This allows us to simply compare modified (obfus-
cated) and unmodified branching basic blocks (BBBl). We
1github.com/llvm-mirror/test-suite/tree/master/SingleSource
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Figure 13: The performance of the five architectures on 6 PARSEC tasks, normalized for the baseline processor.
use Angr to in-parallel parse plain and obfuscated binaries,
detect which BBBl’s have been obfuscated, and store mod-
ified/unmodified BBBl’s into separate categories. We store
several features of BBBl’s, shown in Table 2. As BBBl’s
have different numbers of instructions, we only record a
window of the last I instructions before (and including) the
branch.
Feature Type Description
OPi Int i-th instruction’s opcode
R1i Int i-th instruction’s 1st read register index
R2i Int i-th instruction’s 2nd read register index
RWi Int i-th instruction’s write register index
BRup Bool Is branching to a lower address?
OBF Bool Is branch obfuscated?
Table 2: Features recorded for every branching basic block.
For a window of size I, i is the index of the instruction before
the branch, i ∈ {0,1, ..., I−1}
3. Preprocessing: we use cross-validation and create two
datasets: a training and a test one. To prevent the classi-
fier from learning binary-specific features, the test set is
created with separate binaries from the training set (i.e.,
not just separate basic blocks). Since only the obfuscated
binaries have obfuscated BBBl’s, and only 50% of those
BBBl’s will be obfuscated, the ratio of plain to obfuscated
BBBl’s is 3/1. To balance the two classes, we normalize
the training set to only include one third of plain branches.
Next, since opcodes and register indexes are integers and
it is meaningless to compare instructions by their opcode
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Figure 14: Lookup table (LUT), register, and BRAM usage. The
LFSR, small cache, and large cache designs all use a 16 bit
LFSR. The small and large cache designs have a 256 and 1024-
line direct mapped-cache, respectively.
values, we convert all integers to one-hot vectors.
4. Training: we test several different classifiers. Each classi-
fier is fed with a number of concatenated one-hot vectors,
and is trained to predict the OBF bit, specifying whether
the branch has been obfuscated.
7.1. Classifier Results
We test several classifiers, including: logistic regression, deci-
sion trees, random forest classifiers, and multi-layer percep-
trons. All of the classifiers seem to achieve very similar results,
with an average classification accuracy of 63%. We give the
confusion matrices of different classifiers in Figure 15.
PP PO
TP 544 138
TO 369 313
(a) Decision tree, Acc: 62.8%
PP PO
TP 539 143
TO 351 331
(b) Random forest, Acc: 63.8%
PP PO
TP 533 148
TO 350 331
(c) Logistic regression, Acc: 63.4%
PP PO
TP 519 158
TO 356 321
(d) Multi-layer perceptron, Acc:
62.0%
Figure 15: Confusion matrices of 4 classifiers. TP, TO, PP, and
PO labels stand for "true plain", "true obfuscated", "predicted
plain" and "predicted obfuscated".
In order to test whether the classifier only learns some sta-
tistical information (i.e., that certain branch instructions are
more common in obfuscated binaries compared to plain ones)
or if the classifiers found a pattern in the produced instructions,
we vary the size of the instruction window I. In Figure 16,
we show the accuracy of classifiers trained on features with
different windows sizes.
7.2. Analysis of Classifier Results
As our obfuscation method XORs branch predicates with ran-
dom bits, we would expect that the outputted values are indis-
tinguishable from randomness. Hence, any classifier should
be unable to predict which branches were obfuscated with
an accuracy higher than 50%, assuming that the number of
obfuscated and plain branches is equal. However, Table 15
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Figure 16: The average accuracy of the classifier over 10 ex-
periments with respect to the instruction window size.
shows that all classifiers have some success in predicting
which branch is obfuscated, with an average prediction ac-
curacy of 63%. Interestingly, the majority of classifiers seem
to be unable to distinguish whether a truly obfuscated branch
is obfuscated or plain, but can consistently recognize truly
plain branches as plain.
To understand why classifiers are able to reach accuracies
higher than 50%, we train classifiers with varying window
sizes, as seen in Figure 16. We see that the majority of the
accuracy gains is achieved with a window size of 1, and that
adding more instructions does not significantly improve per-
formance. With only access to the branch instruction opcode
OP 0, branch registers R10, R20, RW0, and the BRup bit speci-
fying whether the branch instruction is branching to an address
above or below it, the classifier is able to get an 11 percentage
point increase over random guessing. Hence, the classifier
is not learning any specific pattern of instructions that may
reveal information about the original LLVM IR or the source
code, but is instead relying on the distribution of different
instructions in the dataset of plain and obfuscated binaries. As
a simple example, consider a non-obfuscating compiler that
outputs certain branch instructions, e.g., BLE and BLT with a
60% and 40% probability, respectively. The obfuscating com-
piler may shift these probabilities to 50% and 50%. Hence,
whenever the attacker decodes a BLT instruction, they can
claim that the branch is obfuscated with 60% probability.
One way to present this is shown in Figure 17. Given an
original high-level language program A, the LLVM front-end
produces LLVM IR, and the back-end produces the binary. If
Drndalo is used to obfuscate the IR, the obfuscated IR is used
to produce the binary. However, some obfuscated programs in
the form of LLVM IR are unlikely to originate directly from
a program expressed in a high-level language such as C. The
classifier recognizes such unlikely program constructs and
classifies them as obfuscated because they rarely appear in
plain binaries.
To illustrate a scenario in which an unlikely LLVM IR is
produced by the obfuscator, consider the top program of Fig-
ure 18 and assume that obfuscator inverts the loop’s branch.
For the sake of clarity we will analyze the obfuscated program
in its lifted version — the version in the C high-level language.
If the lifted obfuscated program in the bottom of Figure 18 is
now analyzed, it can be assessed as highly suspicious. Specifi-
High-level
Program A LLVM IR Binary
FE BE
Obfuscated
LLVM IR
OBF
Obf.
BinaryBE
High-level
Program A* FE
?
Figure 17: Compilation flow of a high-level language program
A, with and without obfuscation. We ask whether there exists
a program A∗ such that the LLVM front-end produces the ob-
fuscated LLVM IR. FE and BE stand for compiler front-end and
back-end, and OBF stands for the Drndalo compiler extension.
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Figure 16: The average accuracy of the classifier over 10 ex-
periments with respect to the instruction window size.
tinguishable from randomness. Hence, any classifier should
be unable to predict which branches were obfuscated with
an accuracy higher than 50%, assuming that the number of
obfuscated and plain branches is equal. However, Table 15
shows that all classifiers have some success in predicting
which branch is obfuscated, with an average prediction ac-
curacy of 63%. Interestingly, the majority of classifiers seem
to be unable to distinguish whether a truly obfuscated branch
is obfuscated or plain, but can consistently recognize truly
plain branches as plain.
To understand why classifiers are able to reach accuracies
higher than 50%, we train classifiers with varying window
sizes, as seen in Figure 16. We see that the majority of the
accuracy gains is achieved with a window size of 1, and that
adding more instructions does not significantly improve per-
formance. With only access to the branch instruction opcode
OP 0, branch registers R10, R20, RW0, and the BRup bit speci-
fying whether the branch instruction is branching to an address
above or below it, the classifier is able to get an 11 percentage
point increase over random guessing. Hence, the classifier
is not learning any specific pattern of instructions that may
reveal information about the original LLVM IR or the source
code, but is instead relying on the distribution of different
instructions in the dataset of plain and obfuscated binaries. As
a simple example, consider a non-obfuscating compiler that
outputs certain branch instructions, e.g., BLE and BLT with a
60% and 40% obability, respectively. The obfuscating com-
piler may s ift these probabilities to 50% and 50%. Hence,
whenever the attacker decodes a BLT instruction, they can
claim that th branch is obfuscated with 60% probability.
One way to present this is shown in Figure 17. Given a
original high-level language program A, the LLVM front-end
produces LLVM IR, a d t e back-end produces the binary. If
Drndalo is used to obf scate the IR, the obfuscated IR is use
to produce the binary. How ver, some obfuscated programs i
the form of LLVM IR are unlikely to originate directly from
a program expressed in a high-level languag such as C. The
classifier recognizes such unlikely program c nstructs and
classifies them as obfuscated because they rarely appe r in
plain binaries.
To illustrate a scenario in which an unl kely LLVM IR is
produced by the obfuscat r, consider the p program of Fig-
ure 18 and assume that obfuscator inverts the lo p’s branch.
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Figure 17: Compilation flow of a high-level language program
A, with and without obfuscation. We ask whether there exists
a program A∗ such that the LLVM front-end produces the ob-
fuscated LLVM IR. FE and BE stand for compiler front-end and
back-end, and OBF stands for the Drndalo compiler extension.
1 int main(int argc, char* args[]) {
2 int n = atoi(args[1]);
3 for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
4 printf("Iteration BB");
5 }
1 int main(int argc, char* args[]) {
2 int n = atoi(args[1]);
3 for (int i = 0; i >= n; i++)
4 printf("Iteration BB");
5 }
Figure 18: A “for” before obfuscation (top) and the program
corresponding to its obfuscated version when the branch is
inverted (bottom).
For the sake of clarity we will analyze the obfuscated program
in its lifted version — the version in the C high-level language.
If the lifted obfuscated program in the bottom of Figure 18 is
now analyzed, it can be assessed as highly suspicious. Specifi-
cally, we see that the i starts with zero, and increases as long
as it is larger than n. As the variable n comes from a program
input, we can detect two possible outcomes of this “for” loop:
either the input n is zero or less and the loop executes infinitely
many times, or n is larger than zero and the loop never exe-
cutes. Thus, we can infer that this loop is either infinite or
never executes. As such a loop is an uncommon construct,
we can infer that the loop is obfuscated. The classifier can
pick up such common and uncommon constructs and make
predictions based on them.
The example in Figure 18 points out a weakness of Drndalo
method that leaps beyond the scope of this work. The weak-
ness roots in the fact that not all valid semantic constructs in
high level programming languages are equally ubiquitous.
8. Related Work
Program obfuscation is a wide research subject and has histor-
ically been approached from significantly different viewpoints.
Some of the research branches that tackle obfuscation are:
1) malware packing [23, 20], 2) intellectual property protec-
tion [29, 11, 21, 32], and 3) resistance to disassembly and
reverse engineering [12, 31]. Normally, the approaches in
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corresponding to its obfuscated version when the branch is
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cally, we see that the i starts with zero, and increases as long
as it is larger than n. As the variable n comes from a program
input, we can detect two possible outcomes of this “for” loop:
either the input n is zero or less and the loop executes infinitely
many times, or n is larger than zero and the loop never exe-
cutes. Thus, we can infer that this loop is either infinite or
never executes. As such a loop is an uncommon construct,
we can infer that the loop is obfuscated. The classifier can
pick up such common and uncommon constructs and make
predictions based on them.
The example in Figure 18 points out a weakness of Drndalo
method that leaps beyond the scope of this work. The weak-
ness roots in the fact that not all valid semantic constructs in
high level programming languages are equally ubiquitous.
8. Related Work
Program obfuscation is a wide research subject and has histor-
ically been approached from significantly different viewpoints.
Some of the research branches that tackle obfuscation are:
1) malware packing [23, 20], 2) intellectual property protec-
tion [29, 11, 21, 32], and 3) istance to dis ssembly and
reverse gineering [12, 31]. Norma ly, th approaches in
literature serve one of the purposes extremely well while fall
short to prote t against other objectives. Fo example, the
approach of Cousins et al.[7] obfuscat s programs in a way
that makes t completely unintelligible for an attacker. Co -
sequently, a program obfuscated in such a way is virtually
resistant to IP thefts. However, if an input that leads to a
vulnerable state is discovered by analyzing the obfuscated pro-
gram it will not go away when the program is deployed. The
attacker in the possession of the critical input will remain in
the position to lead the system to a vulnerable state. The same
is not true for our Drndalo method. In Drndalo, the inputs
that lead to a vulnerable state discovered in the obfuscated
version of the program normally do not lead the deobfuscated
version of the program to a vulnerable state. Nonetheless, the
approach of Cousins et al. is proved to be simulation-secure
— the measure of security that we will describe later in this
section — while Drndalo is not.
Not only that program obfuscation is historically develop-
ing to fulfill multiple purposes but it is also investigated by
multiple research communities. For example, cryptographic
research community gives us the definition of cryptographic
obfuscation. We can utilize this definition to place our Drndalo
method in a spectrum of security and usability of the existing
obfuscation solutions.
Barak et al. [3], in their widely-known work on feasibility
of obfuscation, define obfuscation and the obfuscator. They
intuitively posit an obfuscator O as an efficient probabilistic
“compiler” that takes the plain program P and produces the
obfuscated programO(P). The programsO(P) and P are guar-
anteed to have the same functionality and to be “unintelligible”
from each other. In other words, there is nothing that an adver-
sary can compute from O(P) and cannot from only an oracle
access to P. We refer to such an obfuscator as simulation-
secure. However, the requirements of “unintelligibility” and
“same functionality” allow for certain amount freedom in in-
terpretation. Thus, Barak et al. define the requirements for an
simulation-secure obfuscator by utilizing the concepts of Tur-
ing Machine(TM) and Probabilistic Polynomial-time Turing
Machine(PPT) as are known in complexity-theory, and oracles
as known in cryptography.
A TM O is the obfuscator for the family of TMsF iff all
the following are true:
• (functionality preservation) For all TMs M ∈ F , O(M)
denotes the obfuscated M such that it computes the same
function as M itself.
• (polynomial slowdown) There exists a polynomial p such
that for any M ∈F , |O(M)| ≤ p(|M|). Additionally, if M
halts within t steps, O(M) must halt in p(t).
• (virtual black box) For all PPTA and all TMs M ∈F , there
exists a PPT S that has the oracle access to M, such that
for a negligible function φ
|Pr[A (O(M)) = 1]−Pr[S 〈M〉(1|M|) = 1]| ≤ φ(|M|) (1)
Since TMs are intuitively harder to obfuscate than circuits,
Barak et al. use ∃OT M ⇒∃Ocircuit . By showing that a circuit
obfuscator does not exist, they show that a TM obfuscator
does not exist either. However, it is important to note that this
well-accepted conclusion does not rule out the possibility of
obfuscation for all programs. For example, Barak et al. do not
rule out the obfuscators for finite automata or regular expres-
sions. In fact, Lynn et al. [14] have shown that the provable
obfuscation for point functions do exist under random oracle
model and construct the provable obfuscations of complex ac-
cess control functionalities. Later on, Wee [28] demonstrated
that the random oracle is not necessary and replaced it with
a probabilistic hash function based on a one-way permuta-
tion. Cousins et al.[7] have demonstrated the practicality of
virtual black box obfuscation for the programs of the form
f (x1, . . .xL) =
∧
i∈I yi, for I ⊆ [L]. This programs are referred
to as conjunctions and can be used as approximations of classi-
fiers in machine learning [30]. The approach from [7] achieves
substantial performance overhead reduction when compared
to other similar methods. However, it still does not answer the
question of encoding arbitrary valid programs to conjunctions
chosen from a distribution with enough entropy. The distribu-
tion entropy criteria affects the security of obfuscation. In fact,
we are not aware of a cryptographic obfuscation approach that
is suitable to arbitrary programs expressible in some high-level
language such as C.
In contrast to cryptographic obfuscation approaches, our
Drndalo method is not constrained to any subset of programs
and accepts all the valid programs that are expressible in a
language supported by the LLVM frontends. Additionally, the
functionality preservation criteria from [3] is interpreted in
a narrower sense. Specifically, the functionality is preserved
only with respect to the trusted core. However, the security of
our method is not derived from the computational hardness of a
mathematical problem and therefore does not satisfy the virtual
black box criteria as stated in Equation 1. Notwithstanding, the
security of our method is evaluated against the attack model
described earlier in Section 2.
To the best of our knowledge, the only obfuscation tech-
nique that guarantees simulation-secure obfuscation for an
arbitrary program is proposed by Nayak et al. [16]. They pro-
pose a thorough architecture redesign encompassing scratch-
pad memories, ORAM (oblivious RAM), instruction schedul-
ing and context switching. Nayak et al. do achieve a prov-
ably simulation-secure obfuscation for an arbitrary program
through their hardware redesign but at a price of an over-
head that spans from 8x to 76x. Our Drndalo, although not
simulation-secure, achieves an overhead of only 5% on PAR-
SEC benchmarks.
9. Future Work and Discussion
In previous sections we have demonstrated Drndalo obfus-
cation and deobfuscation procedures and discussed some of
its weak points. The technique is shown to have a very low
performance overhead in comparison to other similar methods.
Our future work will thus seek improvements in two main
directions: 1) improving security guarantees while keeping
performance and hardware overheads low, 2) extending our
attack model to allow the attacker to monitor the execution of
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the obfuscated program.
To improve security guarantees we will perform cryptanal-
ysis of our Drndalo obfuscation under the assumption of a
cryptographically secure hash function. Additionally, we will
strive to approach the ideal of simulation-secure obfuscation
from Equation 1 with regards to our relaxed functionality
preservation requirement as described in Section 8.
Our future work will also encompass additional hardening
of the obfuscation phase. In the analysis of the classifier’s
success rates we concluded that its accuracy comes from ex-
ploiting the compiler’s affinity to use some branch instructions
more often than others. As an improvement to the Drndalo
technique, we will refine the compiler’s code generation phase
so as to utilize branch instructions more uniformly. In our
investigation, we concluded that such a compiler code gener-
ation phase refinement is attainable. The refinement will not
affect the program’s functionality. A uniform utilization of
branch instructions will be achieved through a new register
usage pattern.
10. Conclusion
In this work we explored the space of hardware-software co-
designs for control flow obfuscation. We proposed a compile
time obfuscation technique that relies on a cryptographic hash
function with a secret key and inverts each conditional branch
with the probability of 50%. Only a deobfuscator that holds
the secret key can completely restore the control flow of the
original program. Then, we evaluated both in-software and
in-hardware deobfuscation techniques and demonstrated that
in-software techniques incur an unacceptable performance
overhead. Finally, we proposed multiple in-hardware imple-
mentations of deobfuscation phase as extensions to BRISC-V
platform. The evaluation on the PARSEC benchmark singles
out our 8-cycle and 16-cycle cached-hash implementations as
the best in-hardware deobfuscation technique with an average
performance penalty of around 2% and 5%, respectively. The
added area of the hashed-cache implementation is dominated
by the cache, requiring approximately 10% and 20% more
hardware resources compared to the baseline processor. We
evaluate the security of our obfuscation method by training
a classifier to predict whether individual branches are obfus-
cated or not. We show that classifiers are able to spot some
statistical regularities in the types of instructions used in plain
and obfuscated binaries, and we propose a way of making
Drndalo obfuscation stealthy for these ML classifiers.
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